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Abstract
Consider a society with two sectors (issues or objects) that faces a design prob-
lem. Suppose that the sector-2 dimension of the design problem is fixed and
represented by a mechanism Γ2, and that the designer operates under this
constraint for institutional reasons. A sector-1 mechanism Γ1 constrained im-
plements a social choice rule ϕ in Nash equilibrium if for each profile of agents’
preferences, the set of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism
Γ1 × Γ2 played by agents with those preferences always coincides with the rec-
ommendations made by ϕ for that profile. If this mechanism design exercise
could be accomplished, ϕ would be constrained implementable. We show that
constrained monotonicity, a strengthening of (Maskin) monotonicity, is a nec-
essary condition for constrained implementation. When there are more than
two agents, and when the designer can use the private information elicited
from agents via Γ2 to make a socially optimal decision for sector 1, constrained
monotonicity, combined with an auxiliary condition, is suffi cient. This suffi -
ciency result does not rule out any kind of complementarity between the two
sectors.
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and suggestions. Any errors are solely attributable to the authors.
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1. Introduction
The challenge of implementation lies in designing a mechanism (i.e., game form)
where the equilibrium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendations
given by a social choice rule (SCR) ϕ. If such a mechanism exists, ϕ is said to be
implementable. The fundamental study on implementation in (pure strategies) Nash
equilibrium is thanks to Maskin (1999; circulated since 1977).1
Since this seminal work, the method used in the literature to understand how to
solve an implementation problem is partial equilibrium analysis. This method isolates
outcomes to be allocated as well as agents’preferences for those outcomes from the rest
of the world, under a ceteris paribus (all else equal) assumption. When there is more
than one decision problem and the practice dictated by the partial equilibrium analysis
is taken as a given institutional constraint, Hayashi and Lombardi (2017) quantify the
effect of the practice by showing that the scope of implementation has to be confined
essentially to separable preferences. A centralized allocation mechanismmay be better
equipped to deal with issues arising from non-separability of preferences. However,
this mechanism is not available or feasible in real life.
This leaves the question of whether there are ways to broaden the scope of im-
plementation. The main objective of this study is to examine this question with
only a minimal departure from the standard practice. The departure consists of two
elements.
First, we consider a society with two sectors (issues or objects) that faces a design
problem. We suppose that the sector-2 dimension of the design problem is fixed
and represented by a mechanism Γ2 =
(
(M2i )i∈I , g
2
)
, and that the designer operates
under this constraint for institutional reasons.2 This departure is motivated by the
1Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjöström (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshi-
hara (2013) refine Maskin’s theorem by providing necessary and suffi cient conditions for an SCR
to be implementable in (pure strategies) Nash equilibrium. For an introduction to the theory of
implementation see Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002).
2M2i is agent i’s sector-2 message space and g
2 : M2 → A2 is the sector-2 outcome function.
2
observation that when, for example, a society faces the issue of whether to supply a
public good, it must solve this problem by taking as given how private goods markets
work. When a school authority faces the issue of allocating students to schools, the
authority must solve it by taking as given how the housing market works.
Second, we introduce incomplete, yet not negligible, communication between the
designer and other mechanisms, in the sense that the designer bases his allocation
decision not only on information directly elicited from the agents but also on infor-
mation elicited from them via Γ2. Suppose that Γ2 is a market mechanism for private
goods and that a society faces the issue of sharing the cost of providing a public good
under the constraint of Γ2. Then, the society needs to use the private information
elicited from the agents via Γ2 if it wants to make a socially optimal decision. For the
same reason, when Γ2 is a housing market and a school authority faces the issue of
allocating students to schools under the constraint of Γ2, it needs to use the private
information elicited from the agents via the housing market Γ2.3
Note that this communication creates incentive problems. Indeed, given that
agents are aware that the designer also bases his sector-1 decision on the information
that they transmit to sector-2 mechanism Γ2, agents may have incentives to lie for
manipulating not only outcomes determined by Γ2 but also sector-1 decisions. For
example, once families know that the school authority bases its school allocation
on information that they transmit to the housing market, families have incentives
to use this information for manipulating not only the housing market outcome but
also the school allocation outcome. Therefore, the change described above makes a
significant departure from the standard literature as well as from the problem studied
by Hayashi and Lombardi (2017). Recall that in Hayashi and Lombardi (2017), every
Sector 2 can itself be a collection of many sectors.
3When the designer does not have access to information elicited via other mechanisms, we basi-
cally go back to implementation in partial equilibrium, as studied by Lombardi and Hayashi (2017),
in which there is no communication among sector authorities about the information elicited from
the agents.
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sector-designer is under the assumption of partial equilibrium analysis, and so each
allocation problem is isolated from others.
In this paper, the designer faces a constrained implementation problem. It con-
sists of designing a mechanism for sector 1, Γ1, with the property that for any type
of agents’preferences, the set of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism
Γ1 × Γ2 coincides with the set of outcomes that ϕ would select for those preferences.
If this design exercise can be accomplished, the SCR is said to be constrained imple-
mentable.
Within this set-up, we investigate the theory of implementation pioneered by
Maskin (1999) under the constraint Γ2. Our conclusion is that a small departure
from the standard practice dramatically increases the scope for implementation, in
the sense that our suffi ciency results do not rely on any domain restriction of agents’
preferences. Thus, unlike the negative result of Hayashi and Lombardi (2017), our
suffi ciency result does not rule out any kind of complementarity between the two
sectors.
We also show that an SCR that can be constrained implemented satisfies an invari-
ance condition, named constrained monotonicity. This condition is a strengthening
of monotonicity. Monotonicity means that if an outcome (a1, a2) is recommended
by the SCR ϕ in state θ but ϕ does not recommend it when the state is changed
to θ′, then the outcome (a1, a2) must have fallen strictly in someone’s ordering at
the state θ′. To introduce our condition, suppose that the sector-2 outcome a2 is
supported by a profile of sector-2 strategy choices m2– that is, g2 (m2) = a2. Con-
strained monotonicity requires that if an outcome (a1, g2 (m2)) is recommended by
ϕ in state θ but the SCR ϕ does not recommend it when the state is changed to
θ′, then, to break the Nash equilibrium via some deviation, there exists an agent i
who can generate a sector-2 outcome by varying his own sector-2 strategy choice, m̂2i ,









, which is less preferred than (a1, g2 (m2)) at θ, is strictly
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preferred to (a1, g2 (m2)) at θ′.
Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section 3 defines constrained monotonicity
and shows that it is necessary for constrained implementation. Section 4 provides
our characterization result. Sections 5 provides an account of welfare implications
of constrained implementability. Section 6 studies the relationships between con-
strained implementability and the standard unconstrained implementability. Section
7 concludes.
2. Setting
We consider a finite set of agents indexed by i ∈ I = {1, · · · , n}, which we refer to as
a society. The set of outcomes available to agents is A1 × A2, where As is the set of
sector-s outcomes, for s = 1, 2. The information held by the agents is summarized in
the concept of a state. Write Θ for the domain of possible states, with θ as a typical
state. In the usual fashion, agent i’s preferences in state θ are given by a complete
and transitive binary relation, subsequently an ordering, Ri (θ) over the set A1 ×A2.
The corresponding strict relation is denoted by Pi (θ). We assume that the true state
is common knowledge among the n agents but is unknown to the designer. To avoid
trivialities, we assume that |Θ| ≥ 2 and |A1 × A2| ≥ 2.4
The goal of the designer is to implement an SCR ϕ, which is a correspondence
ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 such that for each state θ ∈ Θ, ∅ 6= ϕ (θ) ⊆ A1 × A2. We refer to
(a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ) as a ϕ-optimal outcome at θ.
A sector-2 mechanism is a collection Γ2 =
(
(M2i )i∈I , g
2
)
where M2i 6= ∅ is agent
i’s sector-2 message space and g2 : M2 → A2 is a sector-2 outcome function. Given a
sector-2 mechanism Γ2, a sector-1 mechanism is a collection Γ1 =
(
(M1i ×M2i )i∈I , g1
)
where M1i ×M2i 6= ∅ is agent i’s message space and g1 : M1×M2 → A1 is a sector-1
outcome function. Thus, the sector-1 outcome function is defined onM1×M2, rather
4Given a set Y , |Y | denotes its cardinality.
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than on M1, and for each profile of (m1,m2), g1 (m1;m2) represents the resulting
sector-1 outcome. This property of Γ1 captures the idea that the designer bases his
sector-1 outcome decision not only on information supplied directly to him by agents
but also on information elicited from agents via Γ2.
A mechanism Γ1×Γ2 together with a state θ defines a strategic game (Γ1 × Γ2, θ),
in which each agent chooses his message and all agents’strategy choices are made
simultaneously (i.e., when making a strategy choice, no agent is informed of the
strategy choice made by any other agent). A strategy profile (m1,m2) ∈M1 ×M2 is


































ms, for s = 1, 2. We write NE (Γ1 × Γ2, θ) for the set of Nash equilibrium profiles of
(Γ1 × Γ2, θ), and (g1 × g2) (NE (Γ1 × Γ2, θ)) for the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes
of (Γ1 × Γ2, θ).
Definition 1 Let Γ2 be given. A sector-1 mechanism, Γ1, constrained (Nash) imple-
ments the SCR ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 if
ϕ(θ) = (g1 × g2)(NE(Γ1 × Γ2, θ)) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
If such a sector-1 mechanism exists, we say that ϕ is constrained implementable.
Let (Γ2, θ) be given. For any agent i, any m2−i and any outcome (a
1, a2), the lower









































































Finally, for any (nonempty) subset B1 × B2 ⊆ A1 × A2, let proj2 {B1 ×B2} denote
the projection of B1 ×B2 onto A2.
3. Constrained monotonicity
In this section, we introduce a new condition, called constrained monotonicity, which
we show to be necessary for our notion of implementation.
A condition that is central to the implementation of SCRs in Nash equilibrium
is (Maskin) monotonicity. According to this condition, if an outcome (a1, a2) is ϕ-
optimal at state θ, and this (a1, a2) does not strictly fall in preference for anyone
when the state is changed to θ′, then (a1, a2) must remain an ϕ-optimal outcome at
θ′. Formally, we present the following definition.
Definition 2 (Maskin, 1999) An SCR ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 is monotonic provided
that ∀ (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 and ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, if (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ) and Li(θ, (a1, a2)) ⊆
Li(θ
′, (a1, a2)) ∀i ∈ I, then (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′).
The key to our analysis is identifying the appropriate notion of monotonicity
in the present setting, which we call constrained monotonicity. To introduce this







represent the set of outcomes that agent i can generate in sector 2 by
varying his own strategy, keeping the other agents’ strategy choices fixed at m̄2−i.
Therefore, we provide the following definition.
Definition 3 Let Γ2 be given. The SCR ϕ : Θ  A1 ×A2 is constrained monotonic
provided that ∀ (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 and ∀θ ∈ Θ, if (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ), then there exists
m2 ≡ m2ϕ (θ, (a1, a2)) ∈M2 such that:
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∀i ∈ I, and
(ii) ∀θ′ ∈ Θ, Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2)) ∀i ∈ I =⇒ (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′).
Suppose that the designer wants to implement the outcome (a1, a2) in state θ.
Part (i) requires the existence of a sector-2 message profile, m2, such that it induces
the sector-2 outcome a2. Moreover, since agents can deviate and misreport in sector
2, the second component of part (i) allows the designer to find a suitable sector-1
punishment outcome for any unilateral deviation from m2. Part (ii) is a constrained
version of monotonicity. With a fixed Γ2 and the assumption that a sector-1 outcome
also depends on the strategies played by agents in sector 2, the set of outcomes that
agent i can generate by unilaterally deviating from an equilibrium profile is smaller
than the set of outcomes that he can induce in the standard Nash implementation
framework. Thus, part (ii) applies the monotonicity condition to this smaller set of
outcomes.
The importance of part (i) is twofold. First, it allows us to construct a sector-1
mechanism, Γ1, that guarantees that every ϕ-optimal outcome results in an equilib-
rium outcome. Second, as in the case of rule 2 of Maskin’s canonical mechanism,
part (i) allows us to devise a Γ1 that questions the credibility of agent i’s report when
all agents except i make exactly the same announcement. Finally, part (ii) is used
to incentivize agents to report the true environment when everyone is lying about
it– that is, when there is a unanimous false announcement.
The condition is a strengthening of monotonicity. To this end, our first result
shows that constrained monotonicity implies monotonicity.
Theorem 1 Let Γ2 be given. If ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 is constrained monotonic, then it
is monotonic.
Proof. Assume that the hypotheses of the theorem are met. Take any (a1, a2), any
θ, and any θ′ such that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ) and Li(θ, (a1, a2)) ⊆ Li(θ′, (a1, a2)), ∀i ∈ I.
We show that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′).
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Since (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ), part (i) of constrained monotonicity implies that there is










1, a2)). Since, by assumption, Li(θ, (a1, a2)) ⊆ Li(θ′, (a1, a2)) and since, by
the definitions of the lower contour sets, Li,m2−i (θ, (a
































and agent i are arbitrary, we have Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆
Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2)), ∀i ∈ I. Part (ii) of constrained monotonicity implies that (a1, a2) ∈
ϕ (θ′), as we aimed to achieve. Thus, ϕ is monotonic.
One can easily check that monotonicity is equivalent to constrained monotonicity
when A2 = {a2}. However, these two conditions are generally not equivalent. This
point is illustrated in Example 1.
Example 1 Monotonicity does not imply constrained monotonicity. There are two
agents, 1 and 2, two states, θ and θ′, and three outcomes, (a1, a2), (a1, b2), and (a1, c2).
Individuals have state-dependent preferences represented in the table below, where
x2 is understood as (a1, x2), and, as usual, x
2
y2 for agent i means that i strictly prefers
x2 to y2, while x2, y2 means that i is indifferent between x2 and y2.
θ θ′
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 1 Agent 2
a2,b2 c2 c2 c2
c2 a2 a2, b2 a2
b2 b2
The designer aims to implement the SCR ϕ, with ϕ (θ) = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2)} and
ϕ (θ′) = {(a1, a2)}. One can check that ϕ is monotonic.
Suppose that the designer faces a Γ2 in which M2i = {m2i , m̂2i } for each agent i
9








The outcome in each box is the outcome of the action profile to which the box
corresponds. Note that, by definition of g2, g2 (m21,m
2
2) = a




Let us first check that part (i) of constrained monotonicity is satisfied. Let us
define m2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)), m2ϕ (θ, (a
1, b2)) and m2ϕ (θ





































for each θ̄ ∈ {θ, θ′}. Then, by
definition, there exists m2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)) = (m21,m
2




















































for each θ̄ ∈ {θ, θ′}.






















































It follows that part (i) of constrained monotonicity is satisfied.
Finally, let us show that part (ii) of constrained monotonicity is violated. By











































Since (a1, b2) is ϕ-optimal at state θ, it follows that the premises of part (ii) of
constrained monotonicity are satisfied. However, (a1, b2) is not ϕ-optimal at state θ′,
in violation of constrained monotonicity.
The next result shows that only constrained monotonic SCRs are implementable.
Theorem 2 If ϕ : Θ  A1 ×A2 is an SCR that is constrained implementable, then
it is constrained monotonic.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 is constrained implementable. Thus, there
exists a Γ1 such that ϕ(θ̄) = (g1× g2)(NE(Γ1×Γ2, θ̄)) for all θ̄ ∈ Θ. Take any θ ∈ Θ
and any (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ). By constrained implementability, there exists (m1,m2) ∈




















, ∀i ∈ I. (1)
Let m2 ≡ m2ϕ (θ, (a1, a2)) ∈M2.
Let us show part (i). Since (m1,m2) ∈ NE(Γ1 × Γ2, θ), it is clear that g2 (m2) =












, for each i ∈ I. Thus, part (i) is satisfied.













, ∀i ∈ I. (2)




















, ∀i ∈ I,
and thus, (m1,m2) ∈ NE(Γ1 × Γ2, θ′). By constrained implementability of ϕ, we
have that (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ (θ′), as we aimed to achieve. Thus, ϕ is constrained
monotonic.
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4. A characterization theorem
While constrained monotonicity is necessary for constrained implementation, it is not
suffi cient.5 We need an extra condition for the suffi ciency result.
As a part of suffi ciency, we introduce constrained no veto power, which is analogous
to the condition of no veto power (Maskin, 1999),6 adjusted for the fact of a fixed
mechanism in sector 2. According to this condition, if there is an outcome (a1, g2 (m2))







then this (a1, g2 (m2)) must be a ϕ-optimal outcome at this θ. Formally, we provide
the following definition.
Definition 4 Let Γ2 be given. The SCR ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 satisfies constrained no
veto power provided that ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀a1 ∈ A1 and ∀m2 ∈M2,∣∣∣{i ∈ I : A1 × g2 (M2i ,m2−i) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ, (a1, g2 (m2)))}∣∣∣ ≥ n−1 =⇒ (a1, g2 (m2)) ∈ ϕ (θ) .
The condition is weak in some contexts, such as in environments in which there are
private goods in sector 1 and there are at least three (non-satiated) agents. However,
in other environments, constrained no veto power might not be a trivial condition.
We are now ready to present our characterization theorem.7
Theorem 3 Assume that n ≥ 3. Any constrained monotonic SCR ϕ : Θ  A1×A2
satisfying constrained no veto power is constrained implementable.
Proof. See the Appendix.




. As we noted in Section 3, constrained monotonicity is




. Maskin (1999, pp. 33—34)’s Example 2 shows that
although an SCR is monotonic, it is not implementable.
6No veto power requires that if an outcome is top-ranked by at least n − 1 agents, then this
outcome should be chosen irrespective of the preferences of the remaining agent.
7We thank a referee for proposing a much simpler proof, which has clear parallels to Maskin’s
theorem (Maskin, 1999, Theorem 3).
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The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the construction of a canonical mechanism that
is similar to that used, for example, in Maskin (1999), but it is modified to deal with
our objective. First, it is constructed to capture the designer’s constraint represented
by Γ2: The designer cannot design the outcome function g2. Second, to capture the
notion that there is a unidirectional flow of information from sector 2 to sector 1, we
modify the mechanism so that its outcomes depend on both m1 and m2.
Heuristically, the SCR is obtained by the following mechanism. Agents simulta-
neously report a state, θ, an outcome for sector 1, a1, and an outcome for sector 2, a2.
Let m2 ∈ M2 be the information elicited from agents via Γ2. If all reports coincide,
and the jth coordinate ofm2 coincides with the jth coordinate ofm2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)) spec-
ified by part (i) of constrained monotonicity, then the designer chooses the sector-1
outcome according to agents’reports. However, if there is a single agent i whose re-
port is not consistent with other reports, the ith coordinate ofm2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)), or both,
then, the sector-1 outcome is the one announced by agent i if the pair (a1i, g2 (m2))
is not better than the pair (a1, a2) announced by the others under the preference for
i announced by the other agents. Otherwise, the designer chooses a sector-1 outcome
b1 such that the pair (b1, g2 (m2)) is not better than the pair (a1, a2) announced by
the others under the preference for i announced by the other agents– the outcome b1












neither of the abovementioned two cases holds, then agents play a modulo game, and
the winner determines the sector-1 outcome.
5. Applications
This section provides two applications. In one, we design a school choice mechanism
under a constraint that we cannot change, and we take how the housing market works
as given. In the other application, we design a public goods provision mechanism
under a constraint that we cannot change, and we take how the private goods market
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works as given.
Note that in these applications, the given sector-2 mechanisms are “satisfactory”
enough to implement Walrasian equilibria. This leaves out the question of what we
can do when we are constrained by a “poor”sector-2 mechanism. We return to this
question in the next section.
5.1 School choice problems constrained by a com-
petitive housing market
There are three disjoint sets C, I, and H of schools, agents, and houses, respectively.
Agents do not own any house and each needs one house. Each school c ∈ C has a
quota, qc, of places. Moreover, each school c has a (strict) priority ranking >c over
I, where agent i has a priority higher than agent j if i >c j. Note that the priority
ranking is state independent. Although it would be more realistic to have the priority
ranking depend on housing allocation, it is diffi cult to know what this ranking is when
agent i takes over agent j’s house by deviating in the housing market: how should
agent j be ranked? Because of this, we assume that school admissions depend on
housing allocations through catchment areas. Thus, let Hc be the set of houses in
the catchment area of school c ∈ C. Note that for any c, c′ ∈ C, Hc and Hc′ may or
may not be disjoint sets.
In what follows, we assume that Π is the set of all school matchings. A school
matching π is a function from I to C such that each agent is assigned to at most one
school or remains unmatched (being unmatched is denoted by ∅), and each school
is matched to at most its quota of agents. The set Σ denotes the set of all house
matchings. A house matching σ is a one-to-one and surjective function from I to H
such that each agent receives one and only one house.
Let A1 ≡ Π be the set of sector-1 outcomes and let A2 ≡ Σ × R|I| be the set of
sector-2 outcomes. Then, (π, σ, z) ∈ A1 × A2 is an outcome, which specifies a school
14
matching, a house matching, and income transfers. Individual i’s (self-regarding)
preferences in state θ ∈ Θ are given by an ordering Ri (θ) over the set A1 × A2. For
each θ ∈ Θ, we assume that agent i’s ordering Ri (θ) is numerically represented by
uθi : A
1 × A2 → R, which is strictly increasing in money. For each θ ∈ Θ, each i ∈ I,
and each π ∈ A1, the sector-2 marginal ordering, R2i [θ, π], on A2 induced by (θ, π) is
defined by
∀ (σ, z) , (σ′, z′) ∈ A2 : (σ, z)R2i [θ, π] (σ′, z′) ⇐⇒ (π, σ, z)Ri (θ) (π, σ′, z′) .





2 → R, which is strictly increasing in money. Let R2 [θ, π] ≡
(R2i [θ, π])i∈I denote a profile of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by (θ, π). Let
R (Θ,Π) be the set of profiles of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by (Θ,Π), with
R2 as a typical element.
The set of feasible outcomes is denoted by F and is defined by
F =
{
(π, σ, z) ∈ A1 × A2|σ (i) ∈ Hπ(i),∀i ∈ I
}
.
In other words, the allocation (π, σ, z) is feasible if each agent i ∈ I is assigned to a
school π (i) that is compatible with his allocated house σ (i), in that this house σ (i)
is in the catchment area of the assigned school π (i). We assume that F is not empty.
Definition 5 Let Γ2 = (M2, g2) be a sector-2 mechanism such that ∀R2 ∈ R (Θ,Π);
it holds that
1. (σ, z) ∈ g2 (NE (Γ2, R2)) if and only if (σ, z) ∈ A2 is a housing competitive
equilibrium for R2, that is, there exists a house price vector p ∈ R|H| such that














, ∀h ∈ H.
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2. ∀(σ, z) ∈ g2(NE(Γ2, R2)), there is a unique m2 ∈ NE(Γ2, R2) such that (σ, z) =
g2(m2) and Li (R2, (σ, z)) = g2(M2i ,m
2
−i) ∀i ∈ I.8
Sector-2 mechanisms that satisfy Definition 5 are found, for example, in Svensson
(1991) and Hayashi and Sakai (2009).
We adopt the following notion of stability.
Definition 6 The outcome (π, σ, z) ∈ F is stable under θ ∈ Θ if there exists a house
price vector p ∈ R|H| such that ∀i ∈ I, zi = −pσ(i) and
(a) ∀c ∈ C with c 6= π(i), and ∀h ∈ Hc,
uθi (π(i), σ(i),−pσ(i)) ≥ uθi (c, h,−ph)
or ∣∣π−1(c)∣∣ = qc and j >c i ∀j ∈ π−1(c).
(b) ∀c ∈ C with c 6= π(i) and σ(i) ∈ Hc,
uθi (π(i), σ(i),−pσ(i)) ≥ uθi (c, σ(i),−pσ(i))
or ∣∣π−1(c)∣∣ = qc and j >c i ∀j ∈ π−1(c).
(c) ∀h ∈ Hπ(i),
uθi (π(i), σ(i),−pσ(i)) ≥ uθi (π(i), h,−ph).





= {(σ′, z′) ∈ A2| (σ, z)R2i (σ′, z′)}. A sector-2 mechanism Γ2 and a profile R2 in-








is a strategy profile


























for its corresponding set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes.
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Parts (a)—(b) require that each agent i either has no incentives to move from
(π(i), σ(i),−pσ(i)) to (c, h,−ph), or cannot move because under (π, σ, z) school c 6=
π (i) has already filled its quota and each agent j assigned to c has a priority higher
than agent i. Part (c) requires that no agent i wants to change σ(i) with a house h
that is in the same catchment area of school π (i), and at the same time remain at
the school π (i) assigned to him by (π, σ, z).
Definition 7 The constrained stable solution of
(
I, C,H, (>c)c∈C , (H




denoted by ϕS (θ), is the collection of all feasible outcomes that are stable under θ,
ϕS (θ) = {(π, σ, z) ∈ F|(π, σ, z) is stable under θ} .
The following theorem establishes that the constrained stable solution is con-
strained implementable when the domain of possible states, Θ, satisfies the following
condition.
Condition 1 The domain Θ satisfies condition 1 if ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ I, and ∀ (π, σ, z) ∈
A1 × A2 with σ (i) /∈ Hπ(i), it holds that
uθi (π
′, σ′, z′) > uθi (π, σ, z) ∀ (π′, σ′, z′) ∈ A1 × A2 such that σ′ (i) ∈ Hπ
′(i).
Condition 1 requires that each agent i strictly prefers living in rather than outside
the catchment area of the assigned school. This domain requirement seems to be a
natural one for the problem at hand.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Θ satisfies Condition 1. Suppose that Γ2 satisfies Defini-
tion 5. Let
(
I, C,H, (>c)c∈C , (H
c)c∈C
)
be given such that |I| = |H| ≥ 3. Then, the
constrained stable solution ϕS, defined over Θ, is constrained implementable.
Proof. Let the premises hold. To prove the statement, it suffi ces to show that ϕS sat-
isfies constrained monotonicity and constrained no veto power. Since the preferences
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of agents are strictly increasing in money, ϕS satisfies constrained no veto power.9
Thus, we need only show that ϕS is constrained monotonic. To this end, from now
on, we fix any θ and any (π, σ, z) ∈ ϕS(θ).
Since by part (c) of Definition 6 no agent wants to move within the catchment area
of the school assigned to him under (π, σ, z), and since by Condition 1 no agent wants
to move outside the catchment area of the school assigned to him under (π, σ, z) while
remaining at the school π (i), it follows that (σ, z) is a housing competitive equilibrium
at R2 [θ, π]. Definition 5 implies that (σ, z) ∈ g2 (NE (Γ2, R2 [θ, π])), that there exists
a unique m2 ∈M2 such that (σ, z) = g2 (m2), and that Li (R2, (σ, z)) = g2(M2i ,m2−i)
∀i ∈ I. Thus, one can see that part (i) of constrained monotonicity is satisfied.
Finally, let us show that ϕS satisfies part (ii) of constrained monotonicity. Fix
any θ′ ∈ Θ and suppose that the premises of part (ii) of constrained monotonicity
are satisfied. We show that (π, σ, z) ∈ ϕS(θ′). Since (π, σ, z) ∈ ϕS(θ), it follows that
(π, σ, z) is stable under θ, that is, it meets the requirements (a)-(c) of Definition 6
and zi = −pσ(i) for all i ∈ I.
Take any (c, h,−ph) such that c 6= π (i) and either h ∈ Hc, or σ(i) ∈ Hc and
h = σ (i). From parts (a)-(b), it follows that each agent i ∈ I either has no incentives
to move from (π(i), σ(i),−pσ(i)) to (c, h,−ph), or if he has incentives to move, he
cannot move because at (π, σ, z) school c has already filled its quota and each agent
j assigned to c has a priority higher than agent i. Since this does not change when
the state moves from θ to θ′, it follows that parts (a)-(b) of Definition 6 are satisfied
at the new state θ′.
Since (π, σ, z) is stable under θ, by part (c) of Definition 6, it holds that no agent
i wants to change the house σ (i) with a house that is in the same catchment area
9By introducing infinitesimal monetary transfers in the sector-1 mechanism. An alternative
way to see that the constrained stable solution is constrained implementable is to observe that in
Theorem 3 constrained no veto power can be replaced with two other auxiliary conditions. These
two conditions are generalizations of unanimity and weak no veto power (see Takashi and Lombardi,
2017).
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while remaining at the school assigned to him by (π, σ, z). Since, by assumption,
Li,m2−i (θ, (π, σ, z)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (π, σ, z)) for all i ∈ I, it follows that part (c) of the
definition continues to hold at θ′.
Since parts (a)—(c) hold at θ′ and since pσ = z is still a competitive price vector
at θ′, we conclude that (π, σ, z) is stable under θ′, and therefore, (π, σ, z) ∈ ϕS (θ′).
Thus, ϕS satisfies constrained monotonicity.
5.2 A public goods provision problem constrained
by a competitive market of private goods
Let us consider an economy with a finite number ` ≥ 1 of private goods and one public
good.10 The consumption set of each agent i is R`+1+ . Each agent i has an endowment
ωi ∈ R`+. The consumption of agent i is denoted by (vi, y) ∈ R`+1+ , where vi ∈ R`+
is the vector of private goods and y ∈ R+ is the public good outcome consumed by
agent i.
The public good is produced in sector 1. The production technology is described
by a production function f : R`+ → R+, which is continuous, strictly increasing, and
strictly quasi-concave. f (x) denotes the maximum level of public good associated
with the vector of factors of production x ∈ R`+. The outcome space of sector 1 is
given by A1 =
{






, where x ≡ (xi)i∈I is the profile of
individual contributions to the production of y.
The outcome space of sector 2 is the set of closed net trade vectors of private






. Then, (x, y, z) ∈ A1×A2 is
a typical allocation, which specifies a technological feasible scale of the public good,
y, a technological feasible profile of individual contributions to the production of y,
and a net trade vector.
10For the sake of simplicity, and to save space, we assume there is one public good. However, the
application can easily be extended to the case in which there are k > 1 public goods.
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We make the following assumption about the set Θ. Agent i’s (self-regarding)
preferences in state θ ∈ Θ are given by an ordering Ri (θ) over the set A1 × A2.
For each θ ∈ Θ, we assume that agent i’s ordering over the consumption space
is numerically represented by uθi : R`+1+ → R, which is continuous, quasi-concave,
and strictly increasing. For each θ ∈ Θ, each agent i, and each sector-1 allocation
(x, y) ∈ A1, the sector-2 marginal ordering, R2i [θ, x, y], on A2 induced by (θ, x, y) is
defined by
∀z, z′ ∈ A2 : zR2i [θ, x, y] z′ ⇐⇒ (x, y, z)Ri (θ) (x, y, z′) .
We assume that agent i’s sector-2 marginal ordering R2i [θ, x, y] is numerically repre-




2+{ωi} → R. Follow-
ing Schmeidler (1980), we assume that υR
2
i [θ,x,y]
i is strictly increasing in the consump-
tion of private goods and satisfies the following assumptions: υR
2
i [θ,x,y]
i (zi + ωi) > −∞
if zi+ωi ∈ R`+; otherwise, υ
R2i [θ,x,y]
i (zi + ωi) = −∞.11 Let R2 [θ, x, y] ≡ (R2i [θ, x, y])i∈I
denote the profile of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by (θ, x, y). Let R (Θ, A1)
be the set of profiles of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by (Θ, A1), with R2 as a
typical element.
The set of feasible outcomes is denoted by F and is defined by
F =
{
(x, y, z) ∈ R`×n+ × R+ × R`×n| (x, y) ∈ A1, z ∈ A2
}
.
Given a vector p ∈ R`+ of prices of factors of production and a level y ∈ R+ of public
good, the cost-minimization problem of sector 1 is
c(p, y) = min
a∈R`+:y=f(a)
p · a.
Definition 8 Let Γ2 = (M2, g2) be a sector-2 mechanism such that ∀R2 ∈ R (Θ, A1);
it holds that
11Note that agent i’s endowment may vary, depending on the production plan chosen by sector
1. However, this is not problematic, because for the sector-2 mechanism of Definition 8 to work, we
need only agents’marginal preferences over the set of net trade vectors.
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1. z ∈ g2 (NE (Γ2, R2)) if and only if z is a competitive equilibrium for R2, that
is, there exists a price vector p ∈ R` such that ∀i ∈ I, p · zi = 0 and
∀z̄i ∈ R` : p · z̄i = 0 =⇒ υ
R2i
i (zi + ωi) ≥ υ
R2i
i (z̄i + ωi) ,
and ∑
i∈Izi = 0.
2. ∀z ∈ g2(NE(Γ2, R2)), there is a unique m2 ∈ NE(Γ2, R2) such that z = g2(m2)
and Li (R2, z) = g2(M2i ,m
2
−i) ∀i ∈ I.
A sector-2 mechanism that satisfies Definition 8 is found in Schmeidler (1980).
In this subsection, we are interested in constrained implementing the ratio solution
of Kaneko (1977) and Diamantaras and Wilkie (1994). To this end, the ratio ri is the
portion of the cost that agent i ∈ I is required to contribute. Thus, ratio allocations
can be defined as follows.
Definition 9 A feasible allocation (x, y, z) ∈ F is a ratio allocation for θ ∈ Θ if
there exist a price vector p ∈ R`+ and a ratio vector r ∈ Rn+, with
∑
i∈I ri = 1, such
that ∑
i∈I





and ∀i ∈ I; it holds that
p · zi = 0 and p · xi = ric(p, y),
and
uθi (zi + ωi − xi, y) ≥ uθi (z̄i + ωi − x̄i, ȳ)
∀z̄i ∈ R` such that p · z̄i = 0, and ∀ȳ ∈ R+ and ∀x̄i ∈ R`+ such that p · x̄i = ric(p, ȳ).
Thus, a ratio allocation (x, y, z) is generated by a ratio vector r and a price vector
p such that the allocation yields each agent the largest level of utility given the
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generalized budget constraints, the market for the private goods clears, and
∑
i∈Ixi is
the vector of factors of production that minimizes the cost of production of y. Note
that if (x, y, z) is a ratio allocation for θ generated by (r, p), then taking the pair (x, y)
as given, the net trade vector z is a competitive allocation for R2 [θ, x, y] generated
by the competitive price vector p. We let ϕr (θ) denote the set of ratio allocations for
θ.
Definition 10 The constrained ratio solution, ϕr, for
(




set of ratio allocations for θ,
ϕr (θ) = {(x, y, z) ∈ F|(x, y, z) is a ratio allocation for θ} .
The following theorem establishes that the constrained ratio solution is con-
strained implementable.
Theorem 5 Let n ≥ 3. Suppose that Γ2 satisfies Definition 8. Then, the constrained
ratio solution ϕr, defined over Θ, is constrained implementable.
Proof. Let the premises hold. To prove the statement, it suffi ces to show that
ϕr satisfies constrained monotonicity and constrained no veto power. Since agents’
preferences are strictly monotonic, the ratio solution satisfies constrained no veto
power. Thus, let us show that it is constrained monotonic. To this end, fix any θ and
any (x, y, z) ∈ ϕr(θ).
Then, the ratio allocation (x, y, z) for θ is generated by a price vector p and a
ratio vector r. Then, z is a competitive equilibrium for the marginal preferences over
the consumption space induced by (x, y), and thus, it is a competitive equilibrium for
R2 [θ, x, y]. By Definition 8, it follows that z ∈ g2 (NE (Γ2, R2 [θ, x, y])), that there is
a unique m2 ∈ NE(Γ2, R2) such that z = g2(m2), and that Li (R2, z) = g2(M2i ,m2−i)
∀i ∈ I. It can be observed that part (i) of constrained monotonicity is satisfied.
Next, fix any θ′ so that the premises of part (ii) of constrained monotonicity are
satisfied when the state changes from θ to θ′. We show that (x, y, z) ∈ ϕr(θ′). Given
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that no agent i finds it profitable to choose any different (z̄i, ȳ, x̄i) such that p · zi = 0
and that x̄i = ric(p, ȳ) in state θ, it follows that no agent i wants to choose differently
when the state moves to θ′. Thus, (x, y, z) is a ratio allocation for θ′ generated by the
price vector p and the ratio vector r. By definition of the ratio solution, we conclude
that (x, y, z) ∈ ϕr (θ′). Thus, the ratio solution is constrained monotonic.
6. Comparative statics
In this section, we examine the relationships between constrained implementability
and the standard unconstrained implementability. The broad question is whether
constrained implementation is easier or more diffi cult to achieve than unconstrained
implementability? Put differently, when does constrained implementability reduce to
unconstrained implementability? The answer to this broad question depends on what
the given mechanism in sector 2 is, what our aim is, and what the preference domain
is. To obtain answers, we pose specific questions and provide answers to them in this
section.
6.1 Implementation when constrained by a “poor”
sector-2 mechanism
First, we ask if we can implement something when an arbitrary mechanism is given
as fixed in sector 2. There is a trivial yes answer here. Provided that Γ2 always allows
Nash equilibria under any marginal ordering, one can always constraint implement a
‘trivial’SCR. It is simply that we do “nothing” in sector 1 and let agents play the
sector-2 game as it is.
Example 2 Fix any â1 ∈ A1. For each θ ∈ Θ, agent i’s sector-2 marginal ordering,
R2i [θ, â
1], on A2, is defined by














Let R2 [θ, â1] = (R2i [θ, â
1])i∈I denote the profile of sector-2 marginal orderings induced
by â1 under θ. Let Γ2 be given. Let us suppose that the set of (pure) Nash equilibrium
strategy profiles of (Γ2, R2 [θ, â1]), denoted by NE (Γ2, R2 [θ, â1]), is not empty for
every state θ ∈ Θ. Define ϕ : Θ→ A1×A2 by ϕ(θ) = {(â1, a2) : a2 ∈ g2 ◦NE(Γ2, R2 [θ, â1])}.
One can implement ϕ by designing Γ1 = (M1, g1) such that M1i = {m1i }, ∀i ∈
I, and g1(m1) = â1. One can easily verify that ϕ is constrained monotonic. Under a
suitable restriction on the set Θ, one can observe that ϕ is constrained implementable.
Observe that the above example is consistent with Example 1. The reason is
that in Example 1, not all equilibria of the sector-2 mechanism are selected by the
SCR under the same profile of marginal orderings. Instead, in the above example,
we include all sector-2 Nash equilibria in the definition of ϕ. This entails that the
set of sector-2 Nash equilibrium outcomes is the same for states inducing the same
marginal orderings over the sector-2 outcome space.
In light of the above example, the question is whether there always exists a “satis-
factory”constrained implementable SCR or not. The answer depends on the quality
of Γ2. For example, the answer is no when Γ2 is a “poor”sector-2 mechanism.
Example 3 Let Γ2 be a constant mechanism, that is, there exists â2 ∈ A2 such that
g2 (m2) = â2 for all m2 ∈M2. Let us suppose that A1 = A2 = A. Moreover, let Θ be
a domain of preferences such that (a, a)Pi(θ)(b, c) for all a, b, c ∈ A such that b 6= c.
Thus, at best, what we can constrained implement is represented by the pair (â2, â2),
which is clearly ineffi cient.
6.2 When does constrained implementability re-
duce to unconstrained implementability?
The analysis so far proves that the design problem of the sector-1 designer is rather
complicated owing to the interplay between the sector-2 mechanism Γ2, the preference
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domain Θ, and the SCR ϕ. However, it is noteworthy that the constrained implemen-
tation exercise of the sector-1 designer reduces to the classical sector-1 implementation
exercise when the preference domain Θ is fully separable, that is, Θ = ΘSEP , the SCR
is decomposable, and Γ2 implements the sector-2 SCR in Nash equilibrium or in one
of its refinements.12 Decomposability is not a necessary condition for constrained
implementation.
We pose the following question: what are the necessary and almost suffi cient
conditions in the special (but still somewhat general) case in which the solution
concept adopted by sector-2 designer is that of Nash equilibrium?13 The answer is
that the conditions of Theorem 3 do not change. To observe this, we introduce below a
new condition, called constrained monotonicity∗ using additional notation, and show
that it is equivalent to constrained monotonicity.
We say that the ordering Ri (θ) is sector-2 separable if R2i [θ, a
1] = R2i [θ, b
1]
∀a1, b1 ∈ A1. To save space, for any sector-2 separable ordering Ri (θ), write R2i (θ)
for the sector-2 marginal ordering induced by Ri (θ). Let R2 (θ) = (R2i (θ))i∈I denote
the profile of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by θ. The preference domain Θ∗ is
defined by
Θ∗ = {θ ∈ Θ|∀i ∈ I, Ri (θ) is a sector-2 separable ordering} .
We assume that ΘSEP ⊆ Θ∗.
Let Γ2 be given. Define the SCR ϕ, over Θ∗, as follows: ∀θ ∈ Θ∗, ϕ (θ) =
ϕ1 (θ) × g2 (NE (Γ2, R2 (θ))), where NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)) denotes the set of (pure) Nash
equilibrium strategy profiles of (Γ2, R2 (θ)), and ϕ1 : Θ∗  A1 is a correspondence.
12The preference domain is fully separable, denoted by ΘSEP , when each state θ ∈ ΘSEP induces,
for each agent and each sector s, a sector-smarginal ordering over As that is independent of outcomes
chosen from the other component set of the outcome space. The SCR ϕ : ΘSEP  A2 × A2 is
decomposable provided that for each sector s ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a (nonempty) correspondence




for each state θ ∈ ΘSEP , where Ds is set
of profiles of sector-s marginal orderings induced by ΘSEP .
13The result of Theorem 6 holds for any suitable refinement of the Nash equilibrium.
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Since ϕ (θ) is not an empty set, by definition, it follows that NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)) and
ϕ1 (θ) are not empty. Constrained monotonicity∗ is defined as follows.
Definition 11 Let Γ2 and Θ∗ be given. The SCR ϕ : Θ∗  A1 × A2 is constrained
monotonic* provided that ∀ (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 and ∀θ ∈ Θ∗, if (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ),
then there exists m2 ≡ m2ϕ (θ, (a1, a2)) ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)) such that parts (i)—(ii) of
constrained monotonicity are satisfied with respect to this m2.
Constrained monotonicity∗ differs from constrained monotonicity in only one as-
pect: the sector-2 message profilem2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)) is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
for (Γ2, R2 (θ)). Nevertheless, constrained monotonicity∗ is equivalent to constrained
monotonicity.
Theorem 6 Let Γ2 be given. The SCR ϕ : Θ∗  A1×A2 is constrained monotonic∗
if and only if it is constrained monotonic.
Proof. Let Γ2 be given. Clearly, constrained monotonicity∗ implies constrained
monotonicity. Thus, suppose that ϕ is constrained monotonic. We show that it
is constrained monotonic∗. Fix any θ ∈ Θ∗ and any (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 such that
(a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ). Constrained monotonicity implies that there exists m2 ∈ M2 such











for all i ∈ I. To ob-
serve that ϕ is constrained monotonic∗, it suffi ces to show that m2 ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)).



















⊆ Li (R2 (θ) , a2). Since the choice of agent i is arbitrary, we obtain
m2 ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)), as we aimed to achieve.
Remark 1 Theorem 6 also holds in the case in which Θ∗ = ΘSEP .
Constrained monotonicity continues to be a necessary and almost suffi cient con-
dition for constrained implementation in the case in which the sector-1 designer does
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not care at all about sector 2. This situation can be modeled by defining the SCR
ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2 by ϕ (θ) = ϕ1 (θ)× g2 (M2), for all θ ∈ Θ, where ϕ1 : Θ  A1 is a
(nonempty) correspondence.14 The reason is that the designer of sector 1 still needs
to condition the outcome of the sector-1 mechanism to strategies played by agents in
sector 2 because, for example, there are complementarities between sectors.
As already noted at the beginning of this subsection, constrained monotonicity
is equivalent to sector-1 monotonicity provided that agents’preference orderings are
fully separable, the SCR ϕ is decomposable, and Γ2 implements the sector-2 SCR in
Nash equilibrium or in one of its refinements.
Definition 12 The sector-1 SCR ϕ1 : Θ  A1 is sector-1 monotonic provided that


















then a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ′).
We now pose the following question: are there cases in which sector-1 monotonic-
ity is equivalent to or implies constrained monotonicity? The following examples
summarize our answers.
Example 4 Let us consider the case in whichA2 = {a2} and ϕ (θ) = ϕ1 (θ)×g2 (M2),
for all θ ∈ Θ, where ϕ1 : Θ  A1 is a (nonempty) correspondence. In this setting,
constrained monotonicity is equivalent to sector-1 monotonicity. Since A2 = {a2},
one can easily observe that constrained monotonicity implies sector-1 monotonicity.
For the converse, take any θ ∈ Θ and any a1 ∈ A1 such that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ). Part
(i) of constrained monotonicity is satisfied, since, by definition of Γ2, there exists





= {a2} for each
agent i ∈ I. Next, take any θ′ ∈ Θ so that Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2))
for each i ∈ I. Since (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ), it follows that a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ). Moreover, given
14This result holds without restricting our attention to Θ∗.
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is the profile of marginal orderings induced by a2 under θ̄, we obtain
Li (R
1 [θ, a2] , a1) ⊆ Li (R1 [θ′, a2] , a1) for each i ∈ I. Sector-1 monotonicity implies
that a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ′), and thus, (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′), by definition of ϕ.
Example 5 For the same reason shown in the above example, constrained monotonic-
ity is equivalent to sector-1 monotonicity when Γ2 is a constant mechanism, that is,
when g2 (m2) = a2 ∈ A2 for all m2 ∈M2.
Example 6 Let Θ = ΘSEP . Let Γ2 be given. Let ϕ2 : D2  A2 denote a
sector-2 SCR, where D2 is set of profiles of sector-2 marginal orderings induced by
ΘSEP . Assume that Γ2 implements ϕ2 in Nash equilibrium, that is, ϕ2 (R2 (θ)) =
g2◦NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)) for all θ ∈ ΘSEP . Define ϕ by ϕ (θ) = ϕ1 (θ)×g2◦NE (Γ2, R2 (θ))
for each θ ∈ ΘSEP .
Let us show that constrained monotonicity is implied by sector-1 monotonic-
ity. Suppose that ϕ1 is sector-1 monotonic. Suppose that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ) for
some θ ∈ ΘSEP . Then, by definition of ϕ, there exists m2 ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ)) such












for each i ∈ I. Thus, ϕ satisfies part (i) of
constrained monotonicity. To verify part (ii), take any θ′ ∈ ΘSEP and suppose that
Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2)) for each i ∈ I. We show that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′).
Let us first show that m2 ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ′)). Fix any agent i and any m̂2i ∈ M2i .















∈ Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2)). Then, by our






. Since the choice of
m̂2i , as well as that of agent i, is arbitrary, one can observe thatm
2 ∈ NE (Γ2, R2 (θ′)),
as we aimed to achieve.
Next, let us show that a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ′). Note that a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ), by definition of ϕ. Fix
any b1 ∈ A1 and any i ∈ I. Let us show that a1R1i (θ) b1 =⇒ a1R1i (θ′) b1. Suppose
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that a1R1i (θ) b
1. Then, since θ ∈ ΘSEP , it follows that (a1, g2 (m2))Ri (θ) (b1, g2 (m2)).
Since Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)) ⊆ Li,m2−i (θ
′, (a1, a2)), it follows that (a1, g2 (m2))Ri (θ′) (b1, g2 (m2)).
Again, since θ ∈ ΘSEP , we obtain a1R1i (θ′) b1. Since the choice of b1, as well as that
of agent i, is arbitrary, we obtain ∀i ∈ I, ∀b1 ∈ A1, a1R1i (θ) b1 =⇒ a1R1i (θ′) b1.
Sector-1 monotonicity implies that a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ′).
Finally, since we have established that a2 ∈ g2 ◦NE (Γ2, R2 (θ′)) and a1 ∈ ϕ1 (θ′),
it follows that (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ′), by definition of ϕ.
It is noteworthy that sector-1 monotonicity implies decomposability of ϕ when
Θ = ΘSEP and Γ2 implements ϕ2 : D2  A2 in Nash equilibrium. The reason is that
for each sector s = 1, 2, as ∈ ϕs (θ′) if as ∈ ϕs (θ) and Rs (θ) = Rs (θ′) ∀i ∈ I.
7. Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate the theory of implementation pioneered by Maskin (1999)
under the assumption that some dimensions of the design problem are fixed and the
designer works under this constraint. Specifically, the designer’s constraint is repre-
sented by mechanisms “solving”implementation problems linked to the implementa-
tion problem at hand. Under the simplifying assumption that there are two sectors,
issues, or objects, we assume that the dimension of sector 2 of the design problem is
fixed. We denote this constraint by Γ2. The implementation problem of the designer
consists of designing a mechanism for sector 1, Γ1, with the property that for any
type of agents’preferences, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of Γ1×Γ2 coincides
with the set of ϕ-optimal outcomes. If this design exercise can be accomplished, the
SCR is said to be constrained implementable.
We identify a necessary condition for constrained implementation, named con-
strained monotonicity. This condition is a strengthened version of monotonicity.
Furthermore, under an auxiliary condition, we show that constrained monotonicity
is suffi cient for constrained implementation. This result is obtained under the infor-
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mational assumption that the designer can use the private information elicited from
agents via Γ2 to make a socially optimal decision for sector 1. Unlike the negative
result of Hayashi and Lombardi (2017), our suffi ciency result does not rule out any
kind of complementarity between the two sectors.
This main result is obtained by imposing a very stringent assumption: there is
complete information among agents. This assumption is not often met in reality.
Moreover, the mechanism used in constructing the proof inherits all limitations of
Nash implementation. Indeed, the devised mechanism has several technical problems,
in addition to having strategy spaces that are diffi cult to interpret. For more on these
limitations, see, in particular, Jackson (1992), Abreu and Matsushima (1992), and
more recently Ollár and Penta (2017). The main result we obtain must be thought
of as providing a theoretical benchmark; its applicability should not be exaggerated.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3
Let Γ2 = (M2, g2) be given. Take any constrained monotonic SCR ϕ : Θ  A1 × A2
satisfying constrained no veto power. Let us define Γ1 = (M1 ×M2, g1) as follows.
For all i ∈ I, agent i’s action space is defined by:
M1i = Θ× A1 × A2 × {0, 1, ..., n} .
Let m1i = (θ
i, a1i, a2i, ki) denote a typical element of M1i . The outcome function g
1 is
defined by the following four rules.
∀ (m1,m2) ∈M1 ×M2,
Rule 1: If m1j = (θ̄, a













is the sector-2 message
specified by part (i) of constrained monotonicity.
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, and agent i plays m1i = (θ
i, a1i, a2i, ki) 6= (θ̄, a1, a2, 0), m2i does




, or both, then there are the
following two cases.




(a1i, g2 (m2)), then (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) = (a1i, g2 (m2)).











, which is not empty by part (i) of
constrained monotonicity.
Rule 3: Otherwise, a modulo game is played: divide the sum
∑
i∈I k
i by the cardi-
nality of I and identify the remainder, which can be 0, 1, · · · , or n − 1. The agent
i∗ with the same index of the remainder is declared the winner of the game and the






, with the convention
that the winner is agent n if the remainder is 0.
Fix any θ ∈ Θ. We show that ϕ (θ) = (g1 × g2)(NE(Γ1 × Γ2, θ)). Let us first
show that ϕ (θ) ⊆ (g1 × g2)(NE(Γ1 × Γ2, θ)). Fix any (a1, a2) ∈ ϕ (θ). Part (i)
of constrained monotonicity implies that there is m2 = m2ϕ (θ, (a
1, a2)) such that











, for each i ∈ I. Then,
let m1i = (θ, a
1, a2, 0), for each i ∈ I, and let agent i ∈ I play m2i . Then, (m1,m2)
falls into Rule 1, and thus, (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) = (a1, a2). Note that no agent can
induce Rule 3. In addition, note that each agent can induce Rule 2 by unilaterally
deviating from (m1,m2). Since no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from
(m1,m2)– since every agent i ∈ I can obtain outcomes only in Li,m2−i (θ, (a
1, a2)), it
follows that (m1,m2) ∈ NE (Γ1 × Γ2, θ), as we aimed to achieve.
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For the converse, take any (m1,m2) ∈ NE (Γ1 × Γ2, θ). We proceed according to
the following cases.
Case 1: (m1,m2) falls into Rule 1.
Then, the outcome is (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) = (a1, a2). Take any agent i ∈ I. First, it
can be easily checked that agent i can never induce Rule 3. Second, by part (i) of





































i ), agent i induces part (1) of Rule 2 and obtains (b
1, b2). Since the choice of





















∀i ∈ I. (4)














Part (ii) of constrained monotonicity implies that (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ (θ), as we
aimed to achieve.
Case 2: (m1,m2) falls into Rule 2.





















and kj 6= 0, agent j








, agent j has only to adjust kj by





well as that of agent j ∈ I\ {i}, is arbitrary, we established that any agent j ∈ I\ {i}






. Since (m1,m2) ∈ NE (Γ1 × Γ2, θ), it
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⊆ Lj,g2,m2−j (θ, (g
1 × g2) (m1,m2)), for all j ∈ I\ {i}.
Constrained no veto power implies that (g1 × g2) (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ (θ), as we aimed to
achieve.
Case 3: (m1,m2) falls into Rule 3.
Fix any agent i ∈ I. Take any m̂2i ∈ M2i and any b1 ∈ A1. Suppose that for all
j ∈ I\ {i}, (θj, a1j, a2j, kj) =
(
θ̄, a1, a2, k
)
for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n. It is clear that








when k 6= 0. Then, let









, for some agent j ∈ I\ {i} -
otherwise, (m1,m2) would fall either into Rule 1 or into Rule 2. Since |Θ| ≥ 2, by


















agent i has only to adjust ki by which he becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Thus, let us consider the case in which (θj, a1j, a2j, kj) 6=
(
θh, a1h, a2h, kh
)
for some
j, h ∈ I\ {i}, with j 6= h. In this case, note that agent i can always induce Rule 3
by playing ki 6= 0. In addition, note that agent i can freely determine the winner of
the modulo game by playing an appropriate integer ki 6= 0.15 It follows that agent








. Since the choice (b1, m̂2i ), as well as















1 × g2) (m1,m2)), for all i ∈ I. Constrained no veto power implies that
(g1 × g2) (m1,m2) ∈ ϕ (θ), as we aimed to achieve.





/n , he can obtain it by
playing ki = n.
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